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Abstract
Intel memory protection keys (MPK) is a new hardware fea-
ture to support thread-local permission control on groups of
pages without requiring modification of page tables. Unfor-
tunately, its current hardware implementation and software
supports suffer from security, scalability, and semantic-gap
problems: (1) MPK is vulnerable to protection-key-use-after-
free and protection-key corruption; (2) MPK does not scale
due to hardware limitations; and (3) MPK is not perfectly
compatible with mprotect() because it does not support per-
mission synchronization across threads.
In this paper, we propose libmpk, a software abstraction
for MPK. libmpk virtualizes protection keys to eliminate the
protection-key-use-after-free and protection-key corruption
problems while supporting a tremendous number of memory
page groups. libmpk also prevents unauthorized writes to
its metadata and supports inter-thread key synchronization.
We apply libmpk to three real-world applications: OpenSSL,
JavaScript JIT compiler, and Memcached for memory pro-
tection and isolation. An evaluation shows that libmpk in-
troduces negligible performance overhead (<1%) compared
with insecure versions, and improves their performance by
8.1× over secure equivalents using mprotect(). The source
code of libmpk will be publicly available and maintained as
an open source project.
1 Introduction
Operating systems (OSs) rely on the memory management
unit (MMU) to define and enforce a process’s access right to
a memory page. The page table maintains a page table entry
(PTE) for each page specifying the permission, e.g., readable,
writable, or executable, and the MMU checks it to determine
the legitimacy of each memory access. OSs can change the
permission by updating PTEs and flushing the translation
lookaside buffer (TLB) to reload the updated PTEs into the
TLB.
Alternatively, some instruction set architectures (ISAs),
e.g., ARM [3] and IBM Power [18], allow OSs to assign a
key to each page, and define the access rights of a process
using a CPU register. This effectively classifies the memory
into multiple groups with the same access rights. Changing
a process’s access right to a group of pages is as easy as
updating a CPU register, which commonly takes about tens
of cycles at most.
Maintaining page access rights is important to prevent at-
tackers from accessing and manipulating arbitrary memory lo-
cations to eliminate information leakage and memory corrup-
tion attacks. An arbitrary read vulnerability of an application
can lead to leak the application’s sensitive information kept in
the memory. For example, the Heartbleed vulnerability of the
OpenSSL library [27] allows attackers to steal the sensitive
data of applications using the library, including cryptographic
private keys and passwords. Further, protecting control data
from the memory corruption attacks helps to prevent ways
to achieve arbitrary code execution. By using information
leakage vulnerabilities, attackers aim to find the locations of
control data (e.g., return addresses and virtual function tables)
and corrupt them with arbitrary write vulnerabilities, to carry
out control-flow hijacking attacks [36].
A number of software- or hardware-based mechanisms
have been proposed to ensure the confidentiality and integrity
of the memory. Some of them [8, 31, 32] are designed to
prevent a class of attacks completely. However, due to their
high costs, others [7, 13, 16, 29, 38] focus on minimizing the
impact of single vulnerability by isolating a small, critical
portion of code and data only, which are practical but have
coverage and/or scalability problems.
Recently, Intel deployed a hardware feature, known as mem-
ory protection keys (MPK). MPK has three advantages over
page-table-based mechanisms: (1) performance, (2) group-
wise control, and (3) per-thread view. First, MPK utilizes a
protection key rights register (PKRU) to maintain the access
rights of individual protection keys associated with specific
memory pages: read/write, read-only, or no access. Unlike
the page-table-based mechanisms that flush the TLB and up-
date kernel-level page-table data structures (virtual memory
areas, VMAs) to change access rights, taking more than 1,000
cycles, MPK only requires to execute a non-privileged instruc-
tion WRPKRU to update PKRU, taking around 20 cycles (§2.3). In
addition, MPK enables execute-only memory [24] because its
access rights are orthogonal to whether the page is executable.
Second, MPK supports up to 16 different protection keys;
that is, there can be up to 16 different memory page groups
consisting of memory pages with the same protection keys. 1
1The default group (0) is special, so only 15 groups are effective in
general.
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The pages that compose a group do not need to be contiguous,
and their access right can be changed at once. This group-wise
control allows developers to change access rights to memory
page groups in a fine-grained manner according to the types
and contexts of data stored in them. For example, a server
application can associate different memory page groups with
different sessions or clients to protect them individually.
Third, MPK allows each thread (i.e., each hyperthread) to
have a unique PKRU, realizing per-thread memory view. Even
if two threads share the same address space, their access rights
to the same page can differ (e.g., read/write versus read-only).
Unfortunately, we find that the current hardware imple-
mentation of Intel MPK and its standard library and ker-
nel supports suffer from (1) security, (2) scalability, and (3)
semantic-gap problems, hindering its widespread adoption.
First, MPK suffers from protection-key-use-after-free and
protection key corruption problems. The protection key as-
signed to a page group can be re-used after deallocation via
pkey_free() system call. However, pkey_free() does not
initialize the protection key field of the page group associ-
ated with the deallocated key, resulting in ambiguity when
the deallocated key is re-assigned to a different group using
pkey_alloc(). Also, if attackers know an arbitrary write vul-
nerability, they can corrupt MPK protection keys stored in a
variable to manipulate an application to change the permission
of a target page group.
Second, MPK does not scale because its PKRU can manage
up to 16 protection keys due to a hardware restriction. When
an application tries to allocate more than 16 protection keys,
pkey_alloc() just returns an error, implying that the applica-
tion itself should implement its own mechanism if it has to
deal with more than 16 memory page groups.
Third, MPK has a semantic gap with the conventional
mprotect() because, unlike mprotect() working at a pro-
cess level, MPK works at a thread level, which results in
potential security and performance problems. For example,
Linux kernel implements an execute-only memory feature
with MPK: mprotect(addr, len, PROT_EXEC). However,
this MPK-based execute-only memory does not consider inter-
thread permission synchronization, which should be ensured
by mprotect() by nature. This allows another thread that did
not execute mprotect() to have a chance to read the execute-
only memory. Further, since some applications still assume a
process-level memory permission model, they cannot benefit
from MPK’s efficiency and group-wise control, unless they
synchronize access rights across threads by themselves.
In this paper, we propose libmpk, a secure, scalable, and
semantic-gap-mitigated software abstraction to fully utilize
MPK in a practical manner. libmpk implements (1) protection
key virtualization to eliminate the protection-key-use-after-
free problem and to support a virtually infinite number of
memory page groups, (2) metadata protection to prevent
attackers from tricking MPK by corrupting the protections
keys in the memory, and (3) inter-thread key synchronization
to ensure the semantics of mprotect() with MPK.
First, libmpk provides virtual protection keys to applica-
tions to hide real hardware keys from them. This design
avoids the protection-key-use-after-free problem by schedul-
ing the mappings between virtual protection keys and hard-
ware protection keys. With the virtual key scheduling, libmpk
scales MPK to support a virtually infinite number of protec-
tion keys with the same semantics: group-wise control and
per-thread view.
Second, libmpk protects its metadata from corruption. Ba-
sically, libmpk makes all virtual protection keys read-only by
hardcoding them to the code and enforcing direct calls. All
other important metadata, including the mappings between
virtual and hardware keys, are maintained in the kernel to
avoid corruption while avoiding unnecessary system calls to
minimize the performance overhead. In addition, libmpk is
designed across the layers—the kernel and user—to protect
its internal metadata from malicious overwrites through privi-
lege separation, and yet to maximize the performance cost by
avoiding unnecessary system calls.
Third, libmpk provides an efficient inter-thread key syn-
chronization technique to utilize MPK as an efficient alter-
native of mprotect() with the same semantics. It is 1.7×–
3.8× faster than mprotect() while varying the number of
4KB pages from 1 to 1,000 (§6.2). This huge performance
improvement benefits from our lazy PKRU synchronization
technique and lacks of TLB flush and VMA update.
To show the effectiveness and practicality of libmpk, we
apply it to three real-world applications: OpenSSL library,
JavaScript just-in-time (JIT) compiler, and Memcached. First,
we modify the OpenSSL library to create secure memory
pages for storing cryptographic keys to mitigate information
leakage. Second, we modify three JavaScript JIT compil-
ers (SpiderMonkey, ChakraCore, and v8) to protect the code
cache from memory corruption, by enforcing the W⊕X secu-
rity policy. Third, we modify Memcached to secure almost
all its data, including slab and hash table whose size can be
several gigabytes. The evaluation results show that libmpk
and its applications have negligible overhead (<1%).
We summarize the contributions of this paper as follows:
• Comprehensive study. We study the design, function-
ality, and characteristics of Intel MPK in detail. Further,
we identify the critical challenges of utilizing MPK: se-
curity (protection-key-use-after-free and protection-key
corruption), scalability (a limited number of hardware
protection keys), and semantic difference (thread view
versus process view).
• Software abstraction. We design and implement
libmpk, a software abstraction to fully utilize MPK. The
protection key virtualization, metadata protection, and
inter-thread key synchronization of libmpk allow appli-
cations to effectively overcome the three challenges.
• Case studies. We apply libmpk to three applications,
OpenSSL library, JavaScript JIT compiler, and Mem-
2
 page#  pkey  perm.
  120        8       r/w
  232        1       r/o
  456        8       r/o
DTLB
 page#  perm.
  232        x
ITLB
120 r/w
page# effectiveperm.
effective
perm.
...
0      1            8         15
PKRU (corea)
r/w n/a r/w n/a...
page#
...
0      1            8         15
r/w r/w r/o n/a...
WRPKRU
RDPKRU
...
...
(per-process, 
PKRU (coreb)
(per-core, asynchronous)
232
456
 
x
r
120 r
232
456
 
r/x
r
OS-managed Userspace process
perm: 
pkey:
(corea) (coreb)
red
  synchronized) blue
: pkey = 1
: pkey = 8
Figure 1: An example showing how MPK checks the permission of
a logical core (hyperthread) on a specific memory page according to
PKRU and page permissions. The intersection of the permissions
determines whether a data access will be allowed. An instruction
fetch is independent to the PKRU.
cached, to show its effectiveness and practicality. libmpk
secures all of them with a few modifications and negligi-
ble overhead.
Organization. §2 explains the current hardware and soft-
ware supports of MPK. §3 describes the limitations of MPK.
§4 depicts the design of libmpk to effectively resolve all the
explained problems. §5 shows real-world applications that
can benefit from libmpk to improve their security. §6 evalu-
ates the security and performance characteristics of libmpk
and the applications. §7 discusses the limitations of libmpk
and possible approaches to overcome them. §8 introduces
related work and §9 concludes this paper.
2 Intel MPK Explained
In this section, we describe the hardware design of Intel MPK
and current kernel and library support. Also, we check the
performance characteristics of MPK to show its efficiency.
2.1 Hardware Primitives
Intel MPK updates the permission of a group of pages by
associating a protection key to the group and changing the
access rights of the protection key instead of individual mem-
ory pages (Figure 1). We explain the hardware primitives of
MPK.
Protection key field in page table entry. MPK assigns a
unique protection key to a memory page group to rapidly
update its permission at the same time. Intel CPUs with
MPK utilize the previously unused four bits of each page
table entry (from 32nd to 35th bits) to store a memory page’s
corresponding key value. Thus, MPK supports up to 16
different page groups. Since only supervised code can access
and change PTEs, the Linux kernel (from version 4.6) started
to provide a new system call, pkey_mprotect(), to allow
applications to assign or change the keys of their memory
pages (§2.2).
Protection key rights register (PKRU). A CPU with MPK
uses the value of PKRU to determine its access right to each
page group. Two bits representing the right are access disable
Name Cycles Description
pkey_alloc() 186.3 Allocate a new pkey
pkey_free() 137.2 Deallocate a pkey
pkey_mprotect() 1,104.9 Associate a pkey key with memory pages
pkey_get()/RDPKRU 0.5 Get the access right of a pkey
pkey_set()/WRPKRU 23.3 Update the access right of a pkey
Ref. mprotect(): 1,094.0 / MOVQ (rbx to rdx): 0.0 / MOVQ (rdx to xmm): 2.09
Table 1: Overhead of MPK instruction, system calls, and standard
library APIs. ref shows the overhead of mprotect() and normal reg-
ister move instructions for comparison. Each component is repeated
10 million times and the microbenchmarks are executed 10 times.
(AD) and write disable (WD) bits. The value of (AD,WD)
represents a thread’s permission to a page group: read/write
(0,0), read-only (0,1), or no access (1,x). PKRU exists for
each hyperthread to provide a per-thread view.
Instruction set. MPK introduces two new instructions
to manage the PKRU: (1) WRPKRU to update the protection
information of the PKRU and (2) RDPKRU to retrieve the current
protection information from the PKRU. WRPKRU uses three
registers as input: the EAX register containing new protection
information to overwrite the PKRU, and the other two registers,
ECX and EDX, filled with zeroes. RDPKRU also uses the three
registers for its operation: it returns the current PKRU value via
the EAX register while overwriting the EDX register with 0. The
ECX register also should be filled with 0 to execute RDPKRU
correctly. Note that, currently, Intel does not document why
WRPKRU and RDPKRU use zeroed ECX and EDX registers during
their execution.
2.2 Kernel Integration and Standard APIs
The Linux kernel supports MPK since version 4.6, and glibc
supports MPK since version 2.27. They focus on how to
manage protection keys and how to assign them to particular
PTEs. The Linux kernel provides three new system calls:
pkey_mprotect(), pkey_alloc(), and pkey_free(). It also
changes the behavior of mprotect() to provide execute-only
memory. Further, glibc provides two userspace functions,
pkey_get and pkey_set, to retrieve and update the access
rights of a given protection key. Table 1 summarizes the
APIs.
pkey_mprotect(). The pkey_mprotect() system call ex-
tends the mprotect() system call to associate a protection
key with the PTEs of a specified memory region while chang-
ing its page protection flag. Interestingly, pkey_mprotect()
does not allow a user thread to reset a protection key to zero,
the default protection key value assigned to newly created
memory pages. We anticipate this is in order to minimize
the misuse of MPK, i.e., denying access to new pages could
result in an application crash.
pkey_alloc() and pkey_free(). The Linux kernel provides
two other new system calls to allocate and deallocate memory
protection keys: pkey_alloc() and pkey_free(). When a
user thread invokes pkey_alloc() with access right, the ker-
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Figure 2: Effect of WRPKRU serialization on simple (i.e., ADD) in-
structions either preceding or succeeding WRPKRU (average of 10
million repetitions).
nel allocates and returns a protection key with corresponding
permission according to a 16-bit bitmap that tracks which
protection keys are allocated. When a user thread invokes
pkey_free(), the kernel simply marks the freed key as avail-
able in the bitmap. The pkey_mprotect() function examines
the bitmap afterward to prohibit the use of non-allocated keys.
Execute-only memory. The Linux kernel supports execute-
only memory with MPK. If a user thread invokes mprotect()
only with PROT_EXEC, the kernel (1) allocates a new protection
key, (2) disables the read and write permission of the key, and
(3) assigns the key to the given memory region.
2.3 Quantifying Characteristics of Intel MPK
To evaluate the overhead and benefits of MPK, We measure
(1) the overhead of the MPK instructions, (2) the overhead of
the MPK system calls, and (3) the overhead of mprotect()
for contiguous memory and sparse memory.
Environment. Our system consists of two Intel Xeon Gold
5115 CPUs (each CPU has 20 logical cores at 2.4GHz) and
192GB of memory. Linux kernel version 4.14 configured for
MPK is installed to this system.
Instruction latency. We measure the latency of RDPKRU and
WRPKRU to identify their micro-architectural characteristics.
Table 1 summarizes the results. The latency of RDPKRU is
similar to that of reading a general register, but the latency of
WRPKRU is high. We anticipate that WRPKRU performs serializa-
tion (e.g., pipeline flushing) to avoid potential memory access
violation due to out-of-order execution. To confirm this, we
insert a various number of ADD instructions before (W1) and
after (W2) WRPKRU and measure the overall latency (Figure 2).
The results show that W2 is always slower than W1, implying
that the instructions executed right after WRPKRU fail to benefit
from out-of-order execution due to the serialization.
System calls. We measure the latency of the four Linux
system calls for MPK (Table 1). The latency of mprotect()
and pkey_mprotect() on a 4 KB page is almost the same
because they use the same function do_mprotect_pkey() in-
ternally. pkey_alloc() and pkey_free() are fast since they
involve only simple operations in the kernel, and the domain
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Figure 3: Overhead of mprotect() on contiguous and sparse mem-
ory (average cost of 10 million repetitions). Protecting contiguous
pages takes shorter than protecting sparse pages.
switching between kernel and userspace dominates their time
costs.
Contiguous versus sparse memory pages. Using MPK to
change page permission only involves an update on the PKRU
and thus is independent of the number of targeted pages and
their sparseness. To show the performance benefit of MPK
over mprotect(), we check how the number and sparseness
of the targeted pages affect the performance of mprotect().
To construct contiguous memory pages, we call mmap() one
time with certain memory size. For sparse memory pages, we
call mmap() several times with one page size. Figure 3 shows
that the overhead of mprotect() increases in proportion to
the number of pages. This is because the number of pages
affects how many VMAs mprotect() needs to look up for
permission update. Moreover, the overhead of mprotect()
becomes high when it is invoked on sparse memory pages
because we need to call mprotect() multiple times for each
of them, introducing frequent context switchings between
kernel and userspace.
Summary. Intel MPK allows a thread to rapidly change
the per-thread access rights to a group of pages associated
with the same protection key, by updating a thread-local
register PKRU which only takes around 20 cycles. Its per-
formance is independent to the number of pages com-
posing a group and their sparseness unlike mprotect().
3 Challenges of Utilizing Intel MPK
We studied Intel MPK can protect sensitive data from un-
intended memory access or expedite mprotect() for large
memory (§2). However, a few challenges exist to utilize MPK
in real-world applications, which are induced by either its
inherent features or the current software interfaces. In this
section, We explain the challenges of using MPK in terms of
security, scalability, and synchronization.
3.1 Potential Security Problems
Currently, MPK suffers from two possible security problems
occured by its interface design.
4
Protection key use after free. pkey_free() just removes
a protection key from a key bitmap and does not update the
corresponding PTEs. Whether or not a key could already
be associated with some pages, the kernel will allocate the
key if it is freed by pkey_free(). If a program obtains a
key that is still associated with some memory pages through
pkey_alloc(), the new page group will include unintended
pages than it is supposed to. A developer can face this vulner-
able situation unconsciously as current kernel implementation
neither handles this automatically nor checks if a free key is
still associated with some pages. The developer community
also recognized the problem, and recommends not to free the
protection keys [1, 12]. Handling this problem superficially
(i.e., wiping protection keys in PTE) without fundamental de-
sign change of memory management in kernel will introduce
huge performance overhead because it requires to traverse the
page table and VMAs to detect entries associated with a freed
key to update them, and flush all corresponding TLB entries.
Protection key corruption. The existing OS supports make
the developer store the allocated protection keys in the appli-
cation’s memory. This design makes allocated protection keys
are vulnerable to corruption. For example, after obtaining a
key by invoking pkey_alloc(), an application stores the key
in its memory to use the key later when it assigns the key to
more pages with pkey_mprotect() or switches the permis-
sion using WRPKRU. An attacker who managed to corrupt such
keys could manipulate one piece of code that has an access
to pages with one key into corrupting the pages with another
key.
3.2 Limited Hardware Resources
As Intel MPK relies on PKRU register for permission change, it
supports only 16 keys currently. It is the responsibility of de-
velopers to ensure that an application never creates more than
16 page groups at the same time. This implies that developers
have to examine the number of active page groups at runtime,
which are used by both the application itself and the third-
party libraries it depends on. Otherwise, the program may
fail to properly benefit from MPK. This issue undermines the
usability of MPK and discourages developers from utilizing
it actively. Hardware solution like adding larger register (i.e.,
AVX) has limitation to scale because MPK utilizes unused
bits in PTE. For example, 512 protection keys will demand 9
bits in page table and TLB entries, requiring enlarged entries
or shrunk address bits.
3.3 Semantic Differences
To change the permission of any page group, MPK modifies
the value of the PKRU. However, the value is only effective
in a single thread because PKRU is thread-local intrinsically
as a register. As a result, different threads in a process can
have different permissions for the same page group. This
thread-local inherence helps to improve security for the appli-
cations that require isolation on memory access among dif-
Name Argument Description
mpk_init evict_rate Initialize libmpk with an eviction rate
mpk_mmap vkey, addr, len, prot Allocate a page group for a virtual key
flags, fd, offset
mpk_munmap vkey Unmap all pages related to a given virtual key
mpk_begin vkey, prot Obtain thread-local permission for a page group
mpk_end vkey Release the permission for a page group
mpk_mprotect vkey, prot Change the permission for a page group globally
mpk_malloc vkey, size Allocate a memory chunk from a page group
mpk_free size Free a memory chunk allocated by mpk_malloc()
Table 2: libmpk APIs.
ferent threads, but makes the semantic of PKRU change differ
from that of mprotect(). mprotect() semantically guaran-
tees that page permissions are synchronized among all threads
in a process, on which particular applications rely. This not
only makes it difficult to accelerate mprotect() with MPK,
but also breaks the guarantee of execute-only memory imple-
mented on mprotect in latest kernel. mprotect() supporting
executable-only memory relied on MPK does not consider
synchronization among threads which developers basically
expect to mprotect(). Even when the kernel successfully al-
locates a key for the execute-only page, another thread might
have a read access to it due to a lack of synchronization. To
make MPK a drop-in replacement of mprotect() for both
security and usability, developers need to synchronize the
PKRU values among all the threads.
4 Software Abstraction of Intel MPK
libmpk provides a secure and usable abstraction for MPK by
overcoming the challenges (§3). A developer can use MPK
easily by either adding calls to libmpk APIs or replacing ex-
isting mprotect() calls with those of libmpk. By decoupling
the protection keys from APIs, libmpk is immunized against
protection-key-use-after-free and protection-key corruption.
Also, libmpk allows an application to create more than 16
page groups by virtualizing the protection keys, and provides
a light-weight inter-thread PKRU synchronization mechanism.
Figure 4 illustrates an overview of libmpk. The current ver-
sion of libmpk consists of 1.5K lines of code in total.
Threat model. We assume an adversary who can corrupt
non-control user data. Arbitrary execution is beyond our
scope because it allows the adversary to request system calls
to directly manipulate permission.
Goals. To utilize MPK for domain-based isolation and
as a substitute for mprotect(), we have to overcome the
three challenges: (1) security problems due to insecure key
management, (2) hardware resource limitations, and (3) dif-
ferent semantics from mprotect(). libmpk adopts the three
approaches (1) key virtualization, (2) metadata protection,
and (3) inter-thread key synchronization that effectively solve
the challenges.
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group with metadata, and mpk_munmap() destroys the page group and
the corresponding metadata. mpk_begin() and mpk_end() provide
domain-based thread-local isolation. mpk_mprotect() synchronizes
permission changes globally.
4.1 libmpk API
libmpk provides eight APIs shown in Table 2. To utilize
libmpk, an application first calls mpk_init() to obtain all the
hardware protection keys from the kernel and initialize its
metadata. mpk_mmap() allocates a page group for a virtual
key, which should be a constant integer that the developer
passes. mpk_munmap() destructs a page group by freeing a
virtual key for the group and unmaps all the pages. libmpk
maintains the mappings between virtual keys and pages to
avoid scanning all pages at this destruction step. On top of
these, libmpk also provides simple heap over each page group
(mpk_malloc() and mpk_free()), so that a developer can also
use one or more page groups to create a heap memory region
for sensitive data.
libmpk provides two usage models for developers. The first
model, a thread-local domain-based isolation model, allows
an application to temporarily unlock a page group only for the
calling thread. mpk_begin() and mpk_end() are the APIs for
this model which make a page group accessible and inaccessi-
ble, respectively. The second model allows an application to
quickly change the access rights to a page group, by replacing
mprotect() with mpk_mprotect(). Figure 5 is example code
showing how to use libmpk APIs.
4.2 Protection Key Virtualization
libmpk enables an application to create more than 16 page
groups by virtualizing the hardware protection keys. When an
application creates a new page group by calling mpk_mmap(),
a virtual key passed as argument is associated with new al-
located metadata for the new group. The application uses
the virtual key to obtain or release the permission, or free the
1 #define GROUP_1 100
2 #define GROUP_2 101
3
4 int domain_based_isolation () {
5 mpk_init(-1); // default eviction rate: 100%
6 char* addr = (char *)mpk_mmap(GROUP_1, NULL, 0x1000,
7 PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
8 // page permission: rw- & pkey permission: --
9
10 mpk_begin(GROUP_1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
11 // page permission: rw- & pkey permission: rw
12
13 // write data in GROUP_1
14
15 mpk_end(GROUP_1);
16 // page permission: rw- & pkey permission: --
17
18 printf("%s\n", addr); // SEGMENTATION FAULT
19 }
20
21 int quick_permission_change () {
22 mpk_init(0.5); // set cache eviction rate: 50%
23 void* addr = mpk_mmap(GROUP_2, NULL, 0x1000,
24 PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
25 // page permission: rw- & pkey permission: --
26
27 mpk_mprotect(GROUP_2, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);
28 // page permission: rwx & pkey permission: rw
29 }
Figure 5: Example code for libmpk APIs.
group, while being prohibited from manipulating hardware
keys. The exact physical key that a page is associated with is
hidden from the program and a developer.
libmpk handles mapping between virtual keys and hard-
ware keys like a cache (Figure 6). If a virtual key is already
associated with a hardware key, the virtual key exists inside
the cache, so further access with it produces a few latencies.
However, if the virtual key was not associated with a hardware
key, it needs to evict another virtual key or do nothing but just
call mprotect() for performance to change a permission. The
frequency of eviction or calling mprotect() is determined by
eviction rate. The cache structure guarantees that a virtual key,
which changes a permission frequently, will be mapped with
a hardware key since it has a high possibility to be included
inside the cache.
libmpk provides two policies to determine the mappings
between virtual and hardware keys. When an application
unlocks a page group thread-locally by calling mpk_begin(),
libmpk always maps the group’s virtual key with a hardware
key and uses it to grant access to the calling thread. libmpk
maintains the mapping until the thread calls mpk_end() to
release the access. For this reason, libmpk cannot ensure that
a calling thread always obtains the access due to hardware
limitations. That is, if all hardware keys are actively used,
libmpk is no longer able to provide any key. In this case,
mpk_begin() raises an exception and lets the calling thread
handle it (e.g., sleeps until a key is available). If a page
group is not used by a thread, libmpk evicts the group by
changing its protection key to 0 (default) and revoking its
page permission to disallow subsequent accesses. Unlike
mpk_mprotect(), mpk_begin() must evict a page group when
6
vkey   pkey
   24        ?
vkey   pkey  #threads
   24       10           2
     1         1           0
...
   75         0           0
vkey   pkey
   24       10
❶ retrieve ❷ return
(a) Hit case: 1 A thread calls mpk_begin() or mpk_mprotect()
with a vkey; 2 libmpk returns the corresponding pkey immediately.
vkey   pkey
   75        ?
vkey   pkey  #threads
   24       10           2
     1    1→0          0
...
   75    0→1          0
vkey   pkey
   75        1
PTEs (vkey=1)
...
pkey: 1→0
...
perm: rw- → ---
PTEs (vkey=75)
...
pkey: 0→1
...
perm: --- → rw-
❶ retrieve
❷ evict and load
❸�return
(only for
mpk_begin)
(b) Miss case: 1 A thread retrieves a vkey, but no corresponding
pkey exists (pkey=0); 2 libmpk evicts the LRU pkey. In addition,
mpk_begin() updates the page permission of the evicted and loaded
page groups using mprotect(); 3 libmpk returns the new pkey.
Figure 6: Key virtualization in libmpk. vkey and pkey represent a
virtual key and its corresponding hardware protection key associated
with a page group. #threads indicates the number of threads running
parallel inside a particular domain.
every key is used to guarantee that a page group is permitted
thread-locally.
The second policy, mpk_mprotect(), also needs to map the
virtual key to a hardware key, but not exclusively. Even when
the page group is accessible, libmpk can unmap a hardware
key and rely solely on the page attributes because all threads
have the access. Hence, libmpk maps only the page groups
whose access rights change frequently. If libmpk fails to find
an available hardware key when it handles mpk_mprotect(),
it unmaps and uses the least recently used (LRU) key for
handling mpk_mprotect(). The hardware key of the evicted
page group turns to 0. To avoid excessive overhead due to
frequent unmapping, a developer can configure an eviction
rate to control whether a hardware key has to be evicted
according to how frequent its permission updates. In our ap-
proach, enforcing executable-only permission is not straight-
forward, because a conventional approach (i.e., mprotect())
does not support executable-only permission. Therefore,
mpk_mprotect() reserves one key for execute-only pages
when an application creates them firstly, and does not evict
this key until all executed-only pages disappear. Every in-
coming executable-only permission request is guaranteed to
get a hardware protection key to achieve executable-only
permission. If mpk_mprotect() already had executable-only
page groups, further executable-only permission requests will
merge the incoming page groups with the existing executable-
only page groups to utilize the reserved key.
Userspacempk_mprotect()
do_pkey_sync()
Kernel
PKRU
Threada
state: running
add hooks
return
update 
(scheduled)
PKRU
Threadb
state: running
PKRU
Threadc
   state: sleep
task_work
WRPKRU
task_work
WRPKRU
kick
call
...
Figure 7: PKRU synchronization: 1 mpk_mprotect() calls
do_pkey_sync() to update the PKRU values of remote threads;
2 do_pkey_sync() adds hooks to the threads’ task_work; 3
do_pkey_sync() kicks all the running threads for synchronization;
4 do_pkey_sync() returns to its caller; 5 The threads update their
PKRUs when they are scheduled to run.
4.3 Metadata Protection
All metadata of libmpk should not be corrupted by an attacker.
The first type of metadata is the virtual key that an application
uses to call libmpk’s API functions. libmpk assumes those
virtual keys are hardcoded in the application binary, and the
application never uses indirect calls to access libmpk’s APIs.
libmpk verifies it by checking the binary at load time to ensure
that all direct invocations of libmpk use hardcoded virtual
keys by checking the call site upon each invocation.
The second one is libmpk’s internal metadata: the map-
pings between virtual keys and hardware keys, and the page
group information. To protect these from malicious over-
writes, libmpk maps one physical page into two virtual pages:
a read-only page for the application and a writable page for the
kernel, and stores the metadata in that page. libmpk slightly
modifies existing system calls (e.g., mmap(), munmap(), and
mprotect()) to manage the metadata in the kernel. Except
metadata management, every management logic for libmpk is
located in userspace to minimize unnecessary overhead from
domain switching between kernel and userspace.
4.4 Inter-thread Key Synchronization
libmpk implements an inter-thread PKRU synchronization tech-
nique, do_pkey_sync(), for mpk_mprotect() for the two pur-
poses: (1) to ensure no thread has the read access to an
execute-only page and (2) to replace existing page-table-based
mprotect() for performance. do_pkey_sync() guarantees
that a PKRU update is globally visible and effective as soon as
it returns. Intuitively, this requires a synchronous inter-thread
communication; the calling thread needs to send messages to
the other threads and wait until they update the PKRU values
and acknowledge it, which suffers from a high cost.
We minimize the inter-thread PKRU synchronization latency
in a lazy manner, leveraging the fact that the PKRU values are
utilized in the userspace. If a remote thread is not currently
being scheduled, it does not need to receive the message
immediately. Even if the thread is currently being scheduled,
it is enough for the thread to have and update the PKRU values
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Application Protection Protected data #pkeys #vkeys Changed LoC
OpenSSL Isolation Private key 1 1 83
JIT (key/page) W⊕X Code cache 15 > 15 CC 10 | SM 18
JIT (key/process) W⊕X Code cache 1 1 CC 18 | SM 24 | v8 134
Memcached Isolation Slab, hashtable 2 2 117
Table 3: Three real-world applications of libmpk. To enable W⊕X
in JavaScript engines, we use two approaches including using a
virtual key for every page in the code cache, namely One key per
page and using a single protection key for all the pages in the code
cache, namely One key per process. CC and SM indicate Microsoft
ChakraCore and Mozilla SpiderMonkey JS engine, respectively.
More code modification is required in Google v8 where W⊕X is
not originally supported. pkeys and vkeys mean protection keys and
virtual keys respectively
when it returns to the userspace. If the calling thread can
create a hook that the other threads will invoke right before
jumping back to the userspace and ensure that they are not
in the userspace, we can guarantee that all the other threads
have the new PKRU values when do_pkey_sync() returns.
Figure 7 illustrates the overall procedure of
mpk_mprotect(). do_pkey_sync() utilizes an existing
hooking point in the Linux kernel to enforce the remote
threads to update the PKRU values right before returning
to the userspace and ensures that all threads use the new
PKRU values by sending rescheduling interrupts. In Linux, a
thread can have a list of callback functions (task_work) that
it will invoke at designated points, including the return to
the userspace. A thread can register a callback for another
by calling task_work_add(). In this way, do_pkey_sync()
lets the remote threads update PKRU values lazily. Although
do_pkey_sync() still needs to send inter-processor interrupts
to ensure that no other thread uses the old PKRU value after a
certain point, our evaluation shows that the overall latency of
mpk_mprotect() is shorter than that of mprotect() (§6.2).
5 Applications
We demonstrate the security benefit, efficiency, and usability
of libmpk by augmenting three types of popular applications:
an SSL library, three JavaScript Just-in-time (JIT) compila-
tion engines, and an in-memory key-value store. Table 3
summarizes the mechanisms (e.g., page isolation or W⊕X)
that we aim to provide as well as the protected data (e.g., key
or code). Evaluation results about these secure applications
are in §6.
5.1 OpenSSL
Transport layer security (TLS) or secure sockets layer (SSL) is
one of the most important security features to prevent attacks
from eavesdropping network traffic by encryption. TLS/SSL
relies on public-key cryptosystems, such as RSA, to authen-
ticate communication parties and to exchange a session key
between them.
OpenSSL is a popular open-source library for offering
encrypted HTTPS and other secure communication by imple-
menting the SSL and TLS protocols. Although it is widely
used open source project, it still suffer from diverse security
threat such as code execution, memory corruption or leak
sensitive information. Especially, information leak bugs are
powerful because a web server contains several sensitive data
(i.e., crypto key, password and personal private data). For
example, Heartbleed bug [27] is one of the information leak
bug in OpenSSL, allowing attacker to have a chance to leak
sensitive information including private keys.
We apply libmpk to OpenSSL to protect its private keys
from potential information leakage by storing the keys in
isolated memory pages. More specifically, we first figure out
all data types that can store private keys (e.g., EVP_PKEY)
and replace their heap memory allocation function from
OpenSSL_malloc() to mpk_malloc() to store them in an iso-
lated memory region. Next, we find all functions that need to
access private keys (e.g., pkey_rsa_decrypt()) and let them
access the isolated memory region by inserting mpk_begin()
and mpk_end() before and after their call sites. Note that it
is possible to wrap individual, legitimate access to the iso-
lated memory region with mpk_begin() and mpk_end() to
minimize the attack window, but it affects performance and
programmability such that this paper does not choose that
approach.
5.2 Just-in-time (JIT) Compilation
JIT compilation dynamically translates interpreted script lan-
guages, e.g., JavaScript and ActionScript, into native machine
code or bytecode to avoid the overhead of full compilation
and repeated interpretation. However, it can suffer from se-
curity problems because it relies on writable code, which
potentially results in arbitrary execution. To support JIT com-
pilation, the code cache that stores code generated at runtime
needs to be writable by a JIT compilation thread to let it write
and update compiled code, and be executable by an execution
thread. This implies that if attackers are able to compromise
the JIT compilation thread, they make the execution thread
execute the code they provide.
ChakraCore [28] and SpiderMonkey [30] mitigate the
abovementioned problem by enforcing the W⊕X security
policy on the code cache with mprotect(). They make the
code cache writable while disallowing execution when they
are updating code, and, after it has updated, they make the
code cache executable while disallowing write. However,
they can suffer from race condition attacks [39] because they
use mprotect() to change page permissions; that is, when a
thread makes the code cache writable with mprotect(), other
threads compromised by attackers can also manipulate the
code cache with the same permission.
We apply libmpk to the three popular JavaScript engines
(SpiderMonkey, ChakraCore, and v8) to enforce the W⊕X
security policy without the race condition problem while
ensuring better performance. Unlike mprotect(), libmpk
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enables per-thread permission such that it can ensure only a
JIT compilation thread has a write right to the code cache.
We propose two approaches to implement the W⊕X policy
with libmpk.
One key per page. A context-free solution is replacing
mprotect() with libmpk APIs to perform fast permission
switches on targeted pages in the code cache. All the protec-
tion keys are initialized with read-only permission when a
new thread is created. We dedicate one protection key to one
page when it is first time re-protected via mprotect(), and
change its page permission to rwx. Later, we only need to
call mpk_begin() and mpk_end() before and after when the
JIT compiler updates the corresponding page. Based on the
observation that mostly only one page is updated at a time, we
still invoke mprotect() if multiple pages change permission.
One key per process. We also propose a new approach
specialized for JavaScript engines, where only a single protec-
tion key is used to protect all code cache. More specifically,
when pages are first time committed from the preserved mem-
ory region into the code cache, they are assigned with the
protection key and their page permission is set to rwx. When-
ever any page in the code cache is to be updated, the script
engine needs to call mpk_begin() and mpk_end(). Although
more pages become temporarily writable, the security of the
code cache is ensured thanks to the per-thread view of the
protection key.
5.3 In-Memory Key-Value Store
In-memory key-value stores, such as Memcached, are widely
used to manage a large amount of data in memory to ensure
low latency and high throughput. Since the performance
is the most important requirement of it, it usually does not
adopt security techniques that hinder its performance, even
if it stores sensitive information. Especially, security tech-
niques whose performance depends on the size of data (e.g.,
mprotect() and encryption) are avoided. This implies that,
if an in-memory key-value store has arbitrary read or write
vulnerabilities, attackers are able to leak or corrupt sensitive
information.
We apply libmpk to an in-memory key-value store, Mem-
cached, to secure almost its entire memory. libmpk’s per-
formance is independent to the size of memory to secure,
so it can efficiently work with Memcached even when the
size of in-memory data is several gigabytes. More specif-
ically, we secure slabs that contain actual values and hash
tables that maintain key-value mappings by replacing Mem-
cached’s malloc() function with mpk_malloc(), and let le-
gitimate functions (e.g., ITEM_key() and assoc_find()) ac-
cess them by wrapping their call sites with mpk_begin() and
mpk_end(). Note that, in our current implementation, we as-
sign two different keys to slabs and hash tables, respectively,
to narrow the attack surface. It is possible to use more keys
to secure slabs in a fine-grained manner, e.g., differentiating
them according to their sizes.
6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate libmpk in terms of its security im-
plication and performance by answering the following ques-
tions:
• What security guarantees does libmpk provide? (§6.1)
• Does libmpk solve the security, scalability, and semantic-
gap problems that existing MPK APIs suffer from with-
out introducing much performance overhead? (§6.2)
• Does libmpk have negligible performance impact and
outperform mprotect() in real-world applications?
(§6.3)
The same system environment explained in §2.3 is used for
performance evaluations.
6.1 Security Evaluation
We first evaluate the security benefits from libmpk regarding
memory protection and isolation. For OpenSSL and Mem-
cached, libmpk provides domain-based isolation to protect
memory space that stores sensitive data. The permission for
the particular memory space set by libmpk is locally effective,
which also prevents malicious accesses from other compro-
mised threads. For example, libmpk manages to prevent mem-
ory leakage from a protected domain to outside. All attack
attempts that exploit a memory corruption vulnerability to
leak or ruin sensitive data stored in the isolated memory space
are killed by segmentation faults because they lack proper
permission. To verify this, we mimic the Heartbleed vulnera-
bility by deliberately introducing a heap-out-of-bounds read
bug and inserting special characters as a decoy private key
placed next to the victim heap region. When the vulnerability
is triggered, OpenSSL hardened by libmpk crashes with in-
valid memory access. However, libmpk cannot fully mitigate
memory leakage that originates inside the protected domain.
Thus, developers should carefully design the domain to mini-
mize the potential attack surface when using libmpk in their
applications.
libmpk can be used by JavaScript JIT compilers to guaran-
tee W⊕X on the pages in the code cache. Unlike mprotect(),
libmpk is immune to race condition attacks launched by com-
promised threads running in parallel due to the thread-local
effectiveness of protection keys. When the JIT compiler relies
on libmpk to switch the permission of a code page for later
updates, other threads controlled by attackers cannot write
malicious shellcode into the page simultaneously. To verify it,
we introduce two custom JavaScript APIs for arbitrary mem-
ory read and write to SpiderMonkey and ChakraCore, and
test a simple PoC that leverages these two APIs to locate the
page of a function being compiled and write shellcode to the
corresponding page. Both SpiderMonkey and ChakraCore
crash with a segmentation fault at the end.
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Figure 8: Latency of libmpk’s key cache with various hit rates,
eviction rates, and different number of threads. mpk_mprotect()
and mprotect() are invoked on a 4 KB page. Red line marks the
overhead of mprotect(). When the hit rate is 100%, mpk_mprotect()
is 12.2× faster than mprotect() for one thread and 3.11× faster for
four threads.
6.2 Microbenchmarks
We run several microbenchmarks to understand the perfor-
mance behavior of APIs in libmpk.
Cache performance. libmpk introduces cache to enable
protection on more than 16 page groups, whose performance
is affected by its eviction rate and hit rate, and the number
of virtual keys in use. We run the following two microbench-
marks to check the cache performance.
Hit rate and eviction rate. The first benchmark measures
cache performance with different hit rates, eviction rates,
and number of threads. We run the benchmark with both one
thread and four threads, where each thread warms up by filling
the key cache to evade cold miss and invokes mpk_mprotect()
on one page for a hundred times after 15 entries are filled.
Figure 8 presents the evaluation results, where (1) the green
box indicates the overhead incurred by the cache hit, which
is dominated by the time cost on WRPKRU and maintaining
internal data structures; (2) the blue box indicates the over-
head incurred by the cache miss, which is dominated by the
time cost on key eviction. More specifically, mpk_mprotect()
needs to unset the protection key that is to be evicted and
bind a new virtual key to it. We test the microbenchmark
with three eviction rates that indicate the ratio of cache misses
that eventually leads to key eviction. If a cache miss occurs
without key eviction, mprotect() is invoked to change the
permission of the pages.
Experimental results show that mpk_mprotect() outper-
forms mprotect() except when the cache hit rate is below
25% with an eviction rate above 50%. This is because, unlike
mprotect(), mpk_mprotect() does not merge and split the
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Figure 9: Average time cost to update permission when original
and modified ChakraCore JIT-compile an increasing number of hot
functions demanding distinct virtual keys.
VMAs of targeted pages. It becomes slow when being tested
with four threads, but is still comparable with mprotect(),
whose latency also increases in a multi-threading program.
Number of virtual keys. To evaluate how the number of
used virtual keys affects the cache performance of libmpk,
we re-implement W⊕X in ChakraCore in a one key per page
approach (see §5.2) and set the eviction rate as 100%. To
introduce an increasing number of pages to be protected (i.e.,
an increasing number of virtual keys to be used) during the
execution of ChakraCore, we design a simple microbench-
mark. The microbenchmark consists of a set of JavaScript
files from 1.js to N.js, each of which contains N hot functions
being invoked for 100,000 times than its previous JavaScript
file. For such a hot function, ChakraCore allocates one more
executable page to store the native code and performs nine
permission switches on the page through one virtual key at
runtime. Without any hot function, ChakraCore allocates
one page in the code cache. We run the original Chakra-
Core (version 1.9.0.0-beta) and the modified one with our
microbenchmarks (from 1.js to 35.js), and record the time
cost of changing permission of the pages in the code cache
(i.e., the execution time of VirtualProtect() and that of
mpk_begin() and mpk_end()) in total. Each JavaScript file
is executed 200 times, and the average time is presented in
Figure 9.
The result shows that with libmpk-based implementation
of W⊕X, the time cost on permission switches linearly in-
crease when more hot functions are emitted and thus more
virtual keys are allocated to protect the code pages of the hot
functions. In particular, after 15 virtual keys are allocated
(marked in red), the time cost increases slightly faster than
before (marked in blue) due to cache eviction. Nevertheless,
the ChakraCore hardened by libmpk still outperforms 3.2×
than the original ChakraCore using mprotect() to enforce
W⊕X.
Memory overhead. libmpk dedicates memory space to
store its internal data structures for maintaining the meta-
data of these page groups under protection (see §4.3). Each
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Figure 10: Latency of inter-thread permission synchronization using
mpk_mprotect() and mprotect() calls on memory of varying sizes.
mpk_mprotect() outperforms mprotect() 1.73× for a single page
and 3.77× for 1,000 pages.
mpk_mmap() allocates 32 bytes of memory to store the infor-
mation of a new page group (e.g., base address and size).
libmpk maintains a hashmap to store the mapping between
virtual keys and hardware keys for fast query and access. In
current implementation, we pre-allocate 32 KB of memory
for the hashmap, and its size will automatically expand when
a program invokes mpk_mmap() more than about 4,000 times.
Synchronization latency. Figure 10 shows the la-
tency of inter-thread permission synchronization using
mpk_mprotect() and mprotect() on memory of varying sizes.
mpk_mprotect() is 1.73× faster than mprotect() when up-
dating the permission of a single page. The latency of
mprotect() increases with the number of pages it changes
due to expensive operations on managing VMAs. Com-
pared to mpk_mprotect(), mprotect() costs at least 3.78×
to change the permission of 1,000 pages. The performance
overhead of mpk_mprotect() is independent of the number
of pages whose permission has been updated. Figure 10
also shows that when there are many threads, the latency of
both mprotect() and mpk_mprotect() increases; mprotect()
flushes more TLBs, whereas mpk_mprotect() creates many
hooks in the kernel.
6.3 Application Benchmarks
We measure the performance overhead of libmpk in practice
by evaluating three applications proposed in §5.
OpenSSL. The Apache HTTP server [11] (httpd) uses
OpenSSL to implement SSL/TLS protocols. To evaluate the
overhead caused by libmpk, which is introduced to protect
private keys, we use ApacheBench to test httpd with both the
original OpenSSL library and the modified one with libmpk.
ApacheBench is launched 10 times and each time sends 1,000
requests of different sizes from four concurrent clients to the
server. We choose the DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA256
algorithm with 1024 bits key as cipher suite in the evaluation.
Figure 11 presents the evaluation result. On average, libmpk
only introduces 0.58% performance overhead in terms of
the throughput. The negligible overhead mainly comes from
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Figure 11: Throughput of original httpd and httpd hardened by
libmpk. libmpk slows down httpd by at most 0.53%.
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Figure 12: Octane benchmark scores of SpiderMonkey and Chakra-
Core with original and libmpk-based W⊕X solutions. libmpk out-
performs the original, mprotect()-based defense by at most 4.75%
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Figure 13: Octane benchmark scores of original v8 and two mod-
ified versions of v8 ensuring W⊕X by SDCG and libmpk. libmpk
only introduces 0.81% overall performance overhead for W⊕X in
v8, compared with 6.68% caused by SDCG.
internal data structure maintenance in libmpk.
Just-in-time compilation. We applied two proposed W⊕X
solutions based on libmpk, namely, one key per page and
one key per process (§5.2) to both Spidermonkey (version
59.0) and ChakraCore (version 1.9.0.0-beta) and evaluated
their performance with the Octane benchmark [15] which
involves heavy JIT-compilation workloads at runtime. Each
JavaScript program in the benchmark was directly executed
by the original and modified script engines for 20 times, and
the average score was recorded. Figure 12 shows the final
results.
For SpiderMonkey, both libmpk-based approaches out-
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perform the mprotect()-based approach on the total score,
namely, 0.38% and 1.26%, which is consistent with the claim
from Firefox developers that enabling W⊕X with mprotect()
in SpiderMonkey introduces less than 1% overhead for the
Octane benchmark. The reason is that SpiderMonkey is de-
signed to get rid of unnecessary mprotect() calls when its
JIT compiler works. The performance scores of nearly all the
programs increase through on key per page (at most 3.60% on
Box2D) and one key per process (at most 4.75% on Box2D), ex-
cept for SplayLatency protected by one key per page, whose
score is dropped by 1.36%. When a large amount of new
executable pages are allocated at runtime but updated few
times afterward, the script engine fails to benefit from fast
permission switches through WRPKRU, but suffers from inten-
sive cache eviction when one key per page is applied.
Our two libmpk-based approaches improve ChakraCore
by 1.01% and 4.39% on the total score of the Octane bench-
mark, respectively. ChakraCore is suitable for libmpk-based
W⊕X solutions since it only makes one page writable per
time regardless of emitted code size. Note that one key per
page increases the performance score of ChakraCore at most
7.96% when testing SplayLatency while one key per pro-
cess improves the performance by mostly 31.11% on Box2D.
Nevertheless, the score of zlib decreases by 2.12% when
one key per process is applied. This is because when new
executable pages are committed, they are protected with the
single protection key, which requires an extra invoking of
pkey_mprotect() on multiple pages. If these pages are rarely
updated afterward, the introduced pkey_mprotect() calls hurt
the overall performance.
The mprotect()-based approach is vulnerable to the race
condition attack figured out by SDCG [39] (see §5.2). SDCG
protects the JIT code pages of v8 with W⊕X by emitting the
code in a dedicated process. The code pages are not writable
in other processes, which prevents the attack. To demonstrate
the performance advantage of our in-process libmpk-based
approaches, which are also free of race condition attacks, we
applied one of our approaches, one key per process, to Google
v8 (version 3.20.17.1 used in [39]) and evaluated the perfor-
mance through the Octane benchmark as well. Figure 13
presents the performance comparison among original v8, v8
with SDCG, and v8 with libmpk. Note that originally, v8
has not deployed W⊕X to protect its code cache so far. Our
approach only introduces 0.81% overall performance loss,
compared with 6.68% caused by SDCG.
To summarize, our libmpk-based approaches, which are
free of the race condition attack, outperform the mprotect()-
based approach currently applied in practice to enforce W⊕X
protection on code cache pages with negligible overhead.
In-memory key-value store. To study the performance
overhead of libmpk when protecting large memory, we evalu-
ate the modified Memcached whose key-value pairs are iso-
lated by libmpk. More specifically, the modified Memcached
pre-allocates 1 GB memory, which is used instead of slab
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Figure 14: Throughput and unhandled concurrent connections of
original Memcached and three versions of Memcached whose key-
value pairs are protected by mpk_begin(), mpk_mprotect(), and
mprotect(). mpk_begin()’s overhead is negligible in comparison to
the original. mpk_mprotect() outperforms mprotect() 8.1× while
ensuring same semantics.
pages allocated by glibc malloc() to store key-value pairs.
Besides the original Memcached, we also evaluate the Mem-
cached whose key-value pairs are protected by mprotect().
To study the performance of mpk_mprotect() in real-world
applications, we also create the Memcached guarded by
libmpk with permission synchronized as another evaluation
target for comparison. Each aforementioned version of Mem-
cached launches with four concurrent threads, and we connect
to it remotely through twemperf [40]. We create from 250 to
1,000 connections per second, and 10 requests are sent during
each connection.
Figure 14 presents the evaluation results. The modified
Memcached hardened by libmpk only has 0.01% overhead
in terms of data throughput and almost no overhead regard-
ing concurrent connections processed per second, which in-
dicates that libmpk performs well even when protecting a
huge number of pages. By contrast, mprotect() introduces
nearly 89.56% overhead in terms of data throughput when
protecting 1 GB memory in Memcached and a large number
of unhandled concurrent connections accumulate in this case.
This is because mprotect() involves page table traversing,
which is considered expensive when dealing with a large
number of pages. To evaluate the synchronization service
of libmpk in practice, we also run Memcached protected by
mpk_mprotect(). This design ensures the same semantics but
outperforms mprotect() 8.1× regarding throughput.
libmpk provides the same functionality of mprotect() with
much better performance when protecting huge size memory.
Moreover, in multi-threading applications, using mprotect()
to ensure in-thread memory isolation requires lock, which is
not required when using libmpk due to its inherent property.
7 Discussion
We discuss potential attacks on both Intel MPK and libmpk.
Rogue data cache load (Meltdown). We found Intel MPK
can suffer from the rogue data cache load, also known as the
Meltdown attack [19, 25]. The rogue data cache load is possi-
ble because current Intel CPUs check the access permission
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to a specific memory page after they have loaded it into the
cache. MPK is not an exception because Intel CPUs check
the access rights of PKRU when checking the page permission
at the same pipeline phase. This allows attackers to infer
the content of a present (accessible) page even when its pro-
tection key has no access right. Since Intel is considering
hardware-level mitigation techniques against the rogue data
cache load [19], we believe this problem will be solved in the
near future.
Control flow hijacking. Developers call pkey_mprotect()
to set a protection key for a group of pages followed by a
series of WRPKRUs to change the permission of the page group.
These two default interfaces provide a new attack surface
when the control flow of a compromised process has been
hijacked. More specifically, attackers can change the PKRU
through WRPKRU to get permission for accessing an isolated
memory space. The protection key for specific memory space
can also be changed by attackers through pkey_mprotect().
To provide firm protection on isolated memory space, devel-
opers can adopt sandboxing techniques [10, 23, 44] to prevent
attackers from invoking these two operations and harden the
control flow of their applications [2, 21, 22, 45].
8 Related Work
libmpk abstracts MPK, which can primarily be used for mem-
ory isolation in the context of security. Though only the
latest Intel processors provide MPK, other architectures also
support similar hardware features for grouping pages, as dis-
cussed in §1. We introduce proposed applications of MPK
and ARM Domain, and other memory isolation mechanisms
designed for different applications. Note that some of them
have the threat models that are different from ours.
MPK applications. During conducting our study, we no-
ticed that there were a few ongoing studies using MPK to
achieve different security goals. Burow et al. [6] leverage both
MPK and memory protection extension (MPX) to efficiently
isolate the shadow stack. ERIM [41] utilizes MPK to isolate
sensitive code and data. In addition, XOM-Switch [46] re-
lies on MPK to enable execute-only memory for unmodified
binaries. Our effort on providing a software abstraction for
MPK is orthogonal to these studies, which are all potential
applications of libmpk. These schemes can leverage libmpk
to achieve secure and scalable key management to create as
many sensitive memory regions as required securely.
Memory protection with similar hardware features.
Memory protection mechanisms have been leveraging new
hardware features for efficiency (e.g., software-based fault
isolation [34, 42]). ARM has a hardware feature named as
Domain [3] and IBM Power supports Storage Protection [18].
ARMlock [47], FlexDroid [35], and Shreds [7] rely on ARM
Domain [3] to isolate untrusted program modules, third-party
libraries, and sensitive code modules, respectively.
Although they have a similar high-level concept compared
to MPK, their underlying designs make them have different
low-level behaviors and potential benefits. Domain differs
from MPK in two folds: the way of defining and switch-
ing permissions. To change the permission for one or more
page groups using Domain, a thread updates a register called
Domain Access Control Register (DACR) which defines a
running thread’s access rights to a particular page group. Un-
like MPK, Domain does not allow an application to update
the register by itself. Instead, it requires the application to
invoke a system call since only the OS kernel can update
DACR. Furthermore, Domain does not support execute-only
pages because it does not allow a thread to define an ad-
ditional access rights for a page group. To make a page
execute-only using MPK, a program can make the page exe-
cutable through mprotect() and forbid page access by using
MPK. By contrast, if a program creates non-readable pages
through Domain, the processor cannot fetch any instructions
from that page. IBM Storage Protection allows a program
to create 32 different page groups, and uses two special reg-
isters to determine the permissions on every page group a
running thread owns as MPK does. Similar to MPK, Storage
Protection has a restriction on the number of page groups
under control. Moreover, there does not exist any software
abstraction to overcome this limitation. Nevertheless, Storage
Protection provides protection keys for kernel memory space
unlike MPK.
Software-based fault isolation (SFI). SFI [42] prohibits
unintended memory accesses by inserting address masking
instructions just before load and store instructions. Sandbox-
ing mechanisms, such as Native Client (NaCl) [14, 34], relies
on SFI to isolate untrusted code. Code-Pointer Integrity [22]
also uses SFI to protect the code pointers from unsanitized
memory accesses. Also, MemSentry [20] provides a unified
memory isolation framework based on hardware features to
reduce the performance overhead of SFI. SFI enables an ap-
plication to partition its memory into multiple regions, but the
cost of address masking limits the shape of partitions, which
are commonly contiguous pieces of memory. By contrast,
MPK enables an application to partition the memory into the
regions with arbitrary shape. Further, the overhead of SFI on
address masking increases by the number of isolated memory
regions unlike MPK.
Multiple virtual address space. Using multiple virtual
address spaces (i.e., multiple page tables) for a program can
protect the memory of sensitive or untrusted components from
the others. SMV [17] uses multiple page tables to isolate
the memory of threads in a single process from each other,
which is similar with [5, 33, 43]. Other systems [4, 9, 26] also
provide different memory views to individual threads or small
execution units using separated page tables. Kenali [37] uses
a page-table-based isolation mechanism to protect sensitive
data in which a separate page table is created for each thread.
Unlike libmpk, these mechanisms suffer from non-negligible
performance overhead due to slow and frequent page table
switches.
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9 Conclusion
Intel MPK supports efficient per-thread permission control
on groups of pages. However, MPK’s current hardware
implementation and software interfaces suffer from secu-
rity, scalability, and semantic-gap problems. To solve these
problems, libmpk proposes a secure, scalable, and semantic-
gap-mitigated software abstraction of MPK for developers
to perform fast memory protection and domain-based iso-
lation in their applications. Evaluation results show that
libmpk incurs negligible performance overhead (<1%) for
domain-based isolation and better performance for a substi-
tute of mprotect() when adopted to real-world applications:
OpenSSL, JavaScript JIT compiler, and Memcached.
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